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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the association between commercial and financial openness of developing
countries. The data suggest that, controlling for GDP/Capita changes and allowing for country
specific effects, increase in a developing country's (exports + imports)/GDP is associated with a
highly significant increase in financial openness [measured by (gross private capital inflows + gross
private outflows)/GDP]. I outline a model accounting for some of the endogenous linkages between
financial and trade openness. I show that developing countries, characterized by high costs of tax
collection and enforcement, opt to use financial repression as an implicit tax on savings. The
resultant financial repression provides the impetus for capital flight. A frequent mechanism
facilitating illicit capital movements is to over invoice imports and under invoice exports with the
scale of these activities being proportional to the commercial openness of the economy. This linkage
is subject to costly control by the fiscal authorities, where curtailing illicit capital flows requires
spending resources on monitoring and enforcement of existing capital controls. The effectiveness
of capital controls would increase with the resources spent on monitoring and enforcement per one
dollar of international trade. Under these circumstances, greater commercial openness increases the
effective cost of enforcing financial repression, thereby reducing the usefulness of financial
repression as an implicit tax. This in turn implies that financial reforms tend to be the by-product
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1.  Introduction and overview 
   
A salient feature of the global economy in recent decades has been the embrace, by 
developing countries, of financial reforms.  The adjustment process to the growing financial 
integration has been rocky, frequently associated with financial crises. These developments 
have led to a spirited debate concerning the wisdom of unrestricted capital mobility between 
OECD and emerging market countries. Various studies have identified circumstances in which 
unlimited capital mobility may be sub-optimal.
1 This paper argues that, notwithstanding the 
above debate, the strongest argument for financial opening may be the pragmatic one. Like it 
or not, greater trade integration erodes the effectiveness of restrictions on capital mobility. 
Hence, for successful emerging markets that engage in trade integration, financial opening is 
not a question of if, but of when and how.   
Some insight into the possible linkages between financial and trade opening is obtained 
by looking at the patterns of changes in openness in the last thirty years.  Figure 1 traces the 
association between changes in commercial openness and financial openness [plotted 
horizontally and vertically, respectively].
2  The units of observations are non-overlapping five 
year changes in the openness measures, throughout 1969-1998, for all countries [subject to data 
availability].  The figure suggests the presence of a positive association between the two.  
Figure 2 reports a similar association, for a sample excluding extreme observations [defined by 
financial openness exceeding 100%, or trade openness exceeding 60%].   It depicts a similar 
                                                 
1 A useful survey of financial liberalization is Williamson and Mahar (1998). See Diaz-
Alejandro, (1985), Rodrik (1999) and Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000) for skeptical 
assessments of the gains from financial liberalization.  See Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyplosz 
(2001) for a cost/benefit study of financial opening.  For studies dealing with the financial 
instability associated with capital account opening see the papers in Edwards and Frankel 
(2002) and Feldstein (2003), and Aizenman (2003) for an overview of the challenges 
associated with financial opening. 
2 Financial openness measures the (gross private capital inflows + gross private 
outflows)100/GDP, using the data documented and applied by Wei and Wu (2002), and 
Prasad, Rogoff, Wei and Kose (2003).  Trade openness measures (exports + imports)100/GDP, 
using the WDI data.   2
positive association between the two.  In order to evaluate the statistical significance of these 
linkages, I apply a panel regression methodology. Table 1 presents the regressions, where the 
dependent variable is the change in financial openness. The explanatory variables are changes 
in trade openness, and changes in the GDP per capita level, allowing for country fixed effects.
3  
Regression 1 reports all developing countries (subject to data availability).  To control for the 
possibility that the results are driven by extreme points, regression 2 excludes from the sample 
developing economies countries that are characterized by financial openness that exceeds 
100%, or by trade openness that exceeds 60%, and small island economies.
4   Finally, 
regression 3 deals only with the OECD countries.
5  The first two regressions indicate a highly 
significant positive association between changes in financial and commercial openness in 
developing countries.  A ten percent increase in commercial openness is associated with, on 
average, a 2.6% increase in financial openness for all the developing countries, and with a 
0.7% increase in financial openness in the trimmed sample of developing countries.  The size 
of this effect in the OECD countries is 2%, but at a substantially lower significance level.  The 
impact of changes in GDP per capita on financial openness are relatively large and highly 
significant for the sample of all developing countries, and for the OECD countries, but weakly 
significant in the trimmed developing countries sample.   
 Needless to say, these regressions are only suggestive, and do not provide information 
on the economic forces inducing the existence of linkages between the two openness measures.  
This paper outlines one possible linkage between the two, operating via public finance 
channels.  Specifically, I argue that the pragmatic case for financial reforms in the presence of 
growing trade integration follows from the endogenous linkages between financial and trade 
openness.  
                                                 
3 The inclusion of the GDP per capita as an explanatory variable is suggested by the linkages 
between the GDP per capital level and financial depth. 
4 Small island economies serve frequently as tax havens, inducing large financial openness 
driven by gaps in tax codes. 
5 The regressions covers 1969-1998, non overlapping observations, each reporting a five year 
average.     3
I show that the relatively costly collection of taxes in developing countries implies that 
financial repression would be part of the menu of taxes.   The impact of financial repression is 
to allow the government to recycle its domestic debt at a lower real interest rate than one that 
would have prevailed with full financial integration, and to tax the option of saving in foreign 
assets.  Hence, one should view the drop in the interest rate facing domestic savers as an 
implicit tax on domestic savings.
6  This tax provides the impetus for capital flight, in search of 
a higher return on savings.  A frequent mechanism facilitating capital flight is over invoicing of 
imports and under invoicing of exports.
7  The scale of these activities is proportional to the 
commercial openness of the economy.  This in turn implies that greater trade openness 
increases the effective financial openness, by providing more opportunities for capital flight.   
This linkage, however, is subject to the costly control of the fiscal authorities.  
Curtailing illicit capital flows requires spending resources on monitoring and enforcement of 
existing capital controls.  Under these circumstances, the effectiveness of capital controls 
would increase with the resources spent on monitoring and enforcement per additional dollar of 
international trade.   
I characterize the pattern of taxes that would maximize consumer’s utility, subject to 
the need to finance a given fiscal outlay (this process is equivalent to minimizing the 
deadweight loss associated with a given fiscal expenditure).  I show that more costly collection 
of taxes and lower commercial openness increase the level of financial repression adopted by 
the policy maker.  A key result of this framework is that greater commercial openness reduces 
the financial repression chosen by developing countries.  This follows from the observation 
                                                 
6 See Giovannini and de Melo (1993) for documenting and measuring financial repression as 
an implicit tax on savings, and Kletzer and Kohli (2003) for analysis of the fiscal implications 
of financial repression in India.  See Dooley (1996) for an overview of financial controls.  
7 Further discussion of trade misinvoicing as a mechanism for illicit capita flight, see Claessens 
and Naudé (1993), Ajayi (1997), Boyce and Ndikumana (2001), Eggerstedt et al. 1995; and 
Collier et al. (2001).  These studies concluded that trade misinvoicing is an important channel 
of capital flight.  For example,  Boyce and Ndikumana (2001) estimated that for twenty five 
Sub-Saharan countries, trade misinvoicing led to $40.6 billion of capital flight in the years 
1970-1996.   4
that greater commercial openness increases the effective cost of enforcing financial repression, 
thereby reducing the usefulness of financial repression as an implicit tax.   Hence, financial 
reforms may be the by-product of greater trade integration.   My model also suggests that 
financial reforms are sustainable only if they do not ignore the fiscal implications of the drop in 
fiscal revenue, and the consequent increase in the cost of recycling the public debt.  Hence, 
sustainability of financial reform requires finding alternative means of taxation, or reducing 
government expenditure. 
This paper is related to several independent strands in the literature, including 
endogenous enforcement and institutions [see Anderson and Marcouiller (1998)], the 
sequencing of reforms literature [see Edwards and van Wijnbergen (1986)], and the association 
between sovereign lending and international trade [see Rose and Spiegel (2002)].  Its main 
conclusion is that optimal financial and commercial openness are intertwined, and that the 
pressure to open the financial system is a by-product of successful trade integration. 
Section 2 outlines the model, and presents the main results.  Section 3 concludes with a 
discussion.  The Appendix derives the main results. 
   5
2.  The model 
  The following section outlines a model describing realistic conditions under which 
greater trade openness leads to financial openness.  I consider a developing country where 
fiscal outlays are financed by means of two taxes: a direct income tax, and an implicit tax 
induced by capital controls.  Both taxes are costly: the income tax is associated with 
deadweight losses due to collection and enforcement costs.  Similarly, enforcing capital 
controls entails costly prevention of illicit capital flight.   
I illustrate the design of optimal policies by considering a small, two goods, two 
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where X is the domestic good , and Y is the foreign, imported good.  To simplify, I normalize 
the prices of both goods to one, and denote consumption by 
2 2 2 1 1 1 ; Y X C Y X C + = + = . 
Consumers are endowed each period withX  units of the domestic good.  The 
authorities tax the income form the endowment  X  at a rate t.  The consumer saves in period 
one D , allocating it between domestic and foreign bonds, D and D*, respectively: 
 
(2)  D C r D t X = - + + - - - 1 1 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ,        
 
where  * D D D + = , and  ) 1 ( 1 1 - - + r D  is the income from the old bonds that are repaid in period 
one.    
The international real interest rate is  * r .  The authorities impose capital control in the 
form of a tax on the foreign bond.  Let f denote the tax rate, implying that the domestic interest 
rate, r, is determined by  
 
                                                 
8 The present model extends Aizenman and Guidotti (1994), by allowing the endogenous 
linkage between commercial and financial openness.   6
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The premium f  is also a measure of the intensity of financial controls.  The existence of the 
premium implies that consumers would have the incentive to engage in illicit capital flight, in 
order to avoid the tax.  This capital flight is intermediated via the trade account, hence its 
potential magnitude would be determined by the volume of imports ( 1 Y ) and exports ( 1 X X - ).  
Preventing illicit capital flows induced by a premium f  requires spending  X t  on enforcement.  
I assume that enforcement and the resultant premium are linked by the following reduced 
form:
9   
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This formulation assumes that larger trade openness requires an equi-proportionate increase in  
enforcement in order to support the given premium.  It also recognizes the diminishing 
marginal efficacy of enforcement.  It will be convenient to focus later on the case of a constant 
elasticity premium: 
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The tax on foreign bonds and the enforcement of financial repression implies that the consumer 
is indifferent between the domestic and the foreign bond.  Hence, the second period budget 
constraint is 
 
                                                 
9   The potential capital flight is assumed to be proportional to imports.  Similar results 
would hold if one assumed that potential capital flight to be proportional to (imports+exports).   7
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I consolidate the periodic budget constraints (2) and (5) into the intertemporal one:: 
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Enforcement of the income tax is associated with collection cost l  per one dollar of gross 
taxes, implying that the net tax collected by a tax t is 
 
  (7)  X t ) 1 ( l -  
 
The net revenue from the income tax, plus the revenue from the domestic bond sold in period 
one finances the fiscal expenditure on  public spending (G), plus the cost of the enforcement of 
capital controls, plus the repayment of old debt: 
 
(8)         ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 1 - - + + + = + - r D X G D X t t l   . 
 
Similarly, the second period fiscal budget constraint is 
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Applying (3), (8), (9) I consolidate the two budget constraints into the intertemporal one: 
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Financial repression imposes taxes on domestic savings at the premium rate, f.  This tax has 
two components: first, it taxes foreign bonds, * D  directly, at the premium rate.  In addition, it 
reduces the cost of financing the domestic debt, D, at the premium rate.  The sum of both   8
implies that financial repression taxes domestic savings,  D D + * .  Unlike the private sector, 
the effective real interest rate facing the fiscal authorities equals the foreign one. 
I characterize the optimal depth of financial repression in two stages.  First, I identify 
the consumer’s behavior.  Next, I find the pattern of taxes that maximizes the consumer’s 
utility.  Using the properties of a Cobb Douglas, I infer that, up to a multiplicative constant 
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The intertemporal consumption pattern is characterized by the conventional FOC: 
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  The policy maker chooses the tax rates t, and the enforcement t  that would maximize 
the utility of the representative agent, subject to the fiscal and the private budget constraints, 
(6), (10), and the first order conditions (11) and (12).  This process is facilitated by 
consolidating the private and the public budget constraints, (6) and (10), into the budget 
constraint that links the consumer’s consumption patterns with the fiscal intertemporal budget 
constraint: 
 




















































l .  The consumption’s net present value 
(discounted at the consumer’s real interest rate), equals the net present value of the (before tax) 
endowment, minus the present value of the government’s demand for goods and services net of 
the tax revenue from financial repression (discounted at the government’s real interest rate), 
minus the cost of the distortions associated with raising taxes (the last two terms in the 
brackets, measuring the deadweight loss associated with the taxes). If all taxes are lump sum,   9
the deadweight terms would be zero.  In the absence of financial repression, t = 0, these terms 












1 l .  Equation (13) 
defines the intertemporal budget constraint determining the trade-off between the income tax 
(t) and financial repression enforcement (t).  To simplify notation, I use the normalization 
1 = X .  Applying consumption’s first order condition (12) it follows: 
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Applying (14) I infer that a marginal perturbation of (dt, dt), subject to the intertemporal 
budget constraint (13), impacts consumer’s welfare by  
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Note that determining the optimal enforcement of capital controls also establishes the optimum 
level of financial repression, as summarized by the premium f.   A useful benchmark is full 
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.  Applying this to (15) I find 
that 
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Equation (15) evaluates the welfare change associated with shifting the tax burden from 
income tax to the tax on savings associated with financial repression.  Equation (17) evaluates 
the sign of (15) in the absence of financial repression.  The marginal benefit resulting from one 
dollar spent on imposing financial repression equals the tax revenue generated by the increase 







 times the tax base D ], times the collection cost 
parameter, l.  This product measures the resource gain associated with the reduction in the 
income tax.  If this gain exceeds the dollar spent on enforcing capital controls, financial 
repression would be applied as an implicit tax on saving.   Higher income tax collection cost, 
lower trade openness (lower b), and higher domestic savings increase the prospect of financial 
repression.   
 


















D , the optimal financial repression is determined by: 
 




























The following characterizes the pattern of optimal taxes and resulting financial repression (see 





-  Full financial integration is optimal in the presence of lump sum taxes (i.e., where l = 0).   
 
-  Costly collection of taxes and low enough commercial openness implies that financial 
repression would be part of the menu of taxes.    
   11
-  Higher savings and more costly collection of taxes increase the optimal level of financial 











, where f ~stands for the optimal 
financial repression premium]. 
 
-  Greater commercial openness (defined by the consumption share of imports, b), tends to 







.  This follows from the 
observation that greater commercial openness increases the effective cost of financial 
repression, reducing thereby the usefulness of financial repression as an implicit tax. 
 
Further insight is gained by considering a simulation of the case where aggregate saving is 
inelastic with respect to the interest rate.   Figure 3 reports the association of financial 
repression tax, f , drawn against the commercial openness, b.  The higher curve corresponds to 
a higher cost of tax collection.   
 
Discussion 
I simplified the analysis by assuming the same income tax (t) in both periods.  
Allowing for intertemporal variation of the income tax would imply that the taxes are set to 
equate the marginal tax distortion across both time periods [as in Barro (1979)], but this 
modification would not impact the characterization of financial repression.   
I also assumed away uncertainty.  The analysis can be extended to the case where 
monitoring implies random interception of illicit capital flight.  Such an extension imply the 
existence of well defined demands for the domestic and the foreign bonds [recall that in the 
present model, the two bonds are perfect substitutes in equilibrium].  Yet, this modification 
would not change the main results dealing with the factors determining the optimal level of 
financial repression [see Aizenman and Noy (2003)].   
Another simplifying assumption has been a constant marginal collection cost of income 
taxes (i.e.,  0 =
dt
dl
).  A plausible alternative is increasing marginal collection cost,  0 >
dt
dl
.    12
The main modification induced by this change would be that higher outstanding public debt, or 
higher fiscal expenditure, would increase the optimal level of financial repression. 
Our openness measure is utility based, being related to the consumption weight of the 
foreign good.  One may argue that the openness of the economy is impacted both by the supply 
and demand side.  Yet, the logic of our discussion is unrelated to the exact determinants of 
openness, as it follows from the enforcement technology, defined by (4).  To illustrate this 
point, Appendix B focuses on the dual case, where there is only one traded good, the 
production function is a Cobb-Douglas in the domestic and the foreign input, and trade is 
determined by the demand for imported inputs.  It is shown there that an exact version of the 
above claim continues to hold.   
The paper ignored the possibility that tariffs could be used for fiscal purposes, as had 
been the case in most developing countries in the mid part of the Twentieth Century.  A reason 
for this omission is that in recent years, tariff rates declined dramatically.  One can add tariffs 
to the model, without impacting the logic of Claim 1. 
 
 
3.  Concluding remarks 
 
The arguments advanced in this paper imply that trade opening will inevitably lead to 
financial opening, increasing thereby the cost of public debt.  Hence, sustainability of the 
resultant financial opening requires a deep fiscal restructuring.  Argentina stands as a sad 
example of this logic.  There, the impact of adopting financial opening without a deep enough 
fiscal restructuring was a massive increase in the cost of refinancing the public debt.  In 
general, while it may take some time for the debt build up to induce a crisis, at the end of the 
process financial repression and inflation remain the default taxes used by weak fiscal systems. 
The public finance linkage between trade and financial openness is only one of the 
possible channels explaining the association between the two.   A unique characteristic of 
financial repression is in its being a hidden link.  Other, more transparent channels include 
trade credits, which imply a direct association between commercial and financial openness.  
Understanding all the hidden linkages between trade and financial opening requires studying 
other important issues.  I close the paper with a review of these issues:   13
 
-  The exact sequencing of the linkages between trade and financial opening, including the 
possibility of periodic reversals due to financial crises.
10 
 
-  The possibility of reverse linkages between financial opening and trade opening.
11 
 
-  The potential importance of political economy considerations in determining the opening 
process. 
 
-  The heterogeneity of the linkages: the degree to which the impact of commercial opening 
differs between the various sub accounts of the financial flows [such as trade credit, FDI, 
short term flows, etc.]. 
 
In a follow up paper [Aizenman and Noy (2003)], we use annual data and find that 
financial openness depends positively on lagged trade openness and the GDP/Capita; and 
negatively on measures of democracy and corruption.  Further investigation of the issues 
described above is left for future research. 
                                                 
10 On the association between financial opening and financial crises see Williamson and Mahar 
(1998),  Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). 
11 For example, greater financial openness my reduce the cost of trade credit and encourage 
FDI, and both adjustments may facilitate more commercial trade.     14
Appendix A 
The purpose of this Appendix is to derive the results summarized in Claim 1.  Suppose 
that there are no lump sum taxes (l > 0), and the public debt is positive, leading to an internal 
equilibrium where financial repression is part of the tax menu.  The first order condition 
characterizing the financial repression is [see (15) and (16)]: 
 
























































.  This condition has a simple interpretation.  The 
graph ( t f t - D ; ) is the financial tax Laffer curve, plotting the association between the 
enforcement cost t and the net revenue from the financial repression.  The optimal level of 
public financing requires being on the left side of the tax Laffer curve, where one dollar spent 
on enforcing capital controls yields more than one dollar of tax revenue. 
Denoting the LHS of (A1) by L, applying the implicit function theorem, and the second 
order condition for maximization, it follows that: 




































Note that  





































































































































































 is the elasticity of the net tax collection from financial repression with 
respect to the enforcement cost.  This elasticity would be less then one as long as the Laffer 
curve is convex with respect to t, implying that in these circumstances  
 

















Finally, I turn to the derivation of 
b ¶
¶L
sign .  I focus on the case of the constant elasticity 
premium, (4’). I denote the semi-elasticity of aggregate saving with respect to the premium by 
h , where  





- = . 
Note that changing the premium reduces the consumer’s interest rate.  Applying (3) I infer that 





*) 1 ( + = h .   
Hence, the semi-elasticity of aggregate saving with respect to the premium corresponds to the 
elasticity of aggregate saving with respect to the real interest rate, h .  The presumption is that 
this elasticity is rather small.
12   Applying this notation, the first order condition (A1) can be 
rewritten as 
                                                 
12 Note that, in the absence of costly enforcement of capital controls, one expects the elasticity of the demand for 
the domestic bond with respect to the domestic interest rate to be large due to the incentive to engage in illicit 
capital flight.      16
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Applying (A1’), I infer that, after several iterations of substitutions 
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There are two useful benchmarks for evaluating the sign of (A9).  First, in the limiting case of 
full financial integration,  
 







































.  Recall that full financial 
integration is optimal with lump sum taxes (i.e,   0 = l  implies  0 ~ = f ).  Hence, for large 
enough collection costs inducing financial repression, greater commercial openness would be 
associated with lower financial openness.   
Another interesting benchmark is the case where aggregate savings is inelastic with 
respect to the real interest rate, and where the international real interest rate is zero 
( 0 * ; 0 = = r h ).  In these circumstances,  
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L
.   17
Hence, higher commercial openness is associated with lower financial repression for premiums 




  The purpose of this Appendix is to illustrate that Claim 1 holds also for the case where 
openness is solely determined by the supply side of the economy.  Specifically, suppose that 
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where Z is a final consumption good, the production of which is given by: 
 
(B2)  1 ; 2 , 1 ; = + = = b a
b a i Y X Z i i i , 
 
where X and Y are the domestic and foreign input, respectively.  The endowment of the 
domestic input is  X .  Both inputs are traded, and their price is normalized to 1.  It is easy to 
verify that in this case, the price of good Z is one, and that  
 
  (B3)  i i i Z X X Y b = - = . 
 
Furthermore, the various budget constraint equations (2)-(10) and (12)-(13) continue to hold in 
this case, where C now measures the consumption of the final good, Z.
14  From this it readily 
follows that the characterization of the optimal finance of government’s expenditure, and claim 
1, continue to hold for the case outlined in this Appendix. 
 
                                                 
13 The exact condition is  ) 1 1 ( 2 l f - - < . 
14 Equation (11) links aggregate consumption with consumption of both domestic and foreign goods in the model 
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D financial openness 
 





Changes in financial and commercial openness, 1969-1998, the full sample. 
 
The fitted regression line is          D financial openness = 1.41 + 0.16 D Commercial openness. 
Financial openness measures the (gross private capital inflows + gross private 
outflows)100/GDP, using the data documented and applied by Wei and Wu (2002), and 
Prasad, Rogoff, Wei and Kose (2003).  Trade openness measures (exports + imports)100/GDP, 
using the WDI data. The units of observations are non-overlapping five year changes in the 
openness measures, throughout 1969-1998, for all countries [subject to data availability].     21
D financial openness 
 






Changes in financial and commercial openness, 1969-1998, all countries, excluding 
extreme points [defined as financial openness > 100%, or commercial openness > 60%]. 
 
The fitted regression line is       D financial openness = .92 + 0.07 D Commercial openness. 
Financial openness measures the (gross private capital inflows + gross private 
outflows)100/GDP, using the data documented and applied by Wei and Wu (2002), and 
Prasad, Rogoff, Wei and Kose (2003).  Trade openness measures (exports + imports)100/GDP, 
using the WDI data. The units of observations are non-overlapping five year changes in the 
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Figure 3 
Optimal financial repression and commercial openness, drawn for  
. 1 . 0 ; 5 . 0 ; 1 = = = D h w    
The higher (lower) curve corresponds to  ) 2 . 0 ( 4 . 0 = = l l , respectively. 
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Table one 




            (1)        (2)      (3) 
 
Sample specification      Developing countries      Developing – extreme val.
15         OECD  
 
 
D Comm. openness      0.26***      0.067***    0.2* 
 





D GDP pre capita    .0047**       0.0012*    0.0032*** 
 
          (2.1)         (1.607)      (4.83) 
         
 
R-squared         0.27                  0.43      0.44 
 
N           447                              309         87 
 
 
Dependent variable:      D financial openness 
All regressions include country fixed effects.  Constant terms not reported.                            
The t value are reported below the corresponding coefficients. 
A “****, “**” , “*” indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, 
respectively. 
Financial openness measures the (gross private capital inflows + gross private 
outflows)100/GDP, using the data documented and applied by Wei and Wu (2002), and 
Prasad, Rogoff, Wei and Kose (2003).   
Trade openness measures (exports + imports)100/GDP, using the WDI data. The units of 
observations are non-overlapping five year changes in the openness measures, throughout 
1969-1998. 
                                                 
15 The developing countries, excluding island economies, and countries whose financial 
openness exceeds 100%, and trade openness exceeds 60%. 